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## DEPARTMENT OF STATECIAL ASSISTANT

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DEC 2 1 1945

MR. McCORMACK December 20, 1945.

SA/Mc Colonel McCormack

A-B William Benton Discus, But and 22 Da

Last night very late and very tired I hastily read your Annex VI. I am concerned about your proposed compromise. It seems to me that we are on the soundest possible ground when we insist that the International Intelligence Authority be in the control of civilians - and this means the State Department should have the responsibility for the appointment of the key executive whose office should also be here in the Department.

Isn't this even more apparent in light of Truman's message of this morning which foreshadows merger of the Army and the Navy? Maybe a compromise, if we need one, would involve setting up the top control in the hands of the Secretary of State, the new Secretary of the Department of Defense, or whatever it will be called, and a civilian either from within Government or outside of it to be appointed by the President.

Another device might be to put the responsibility for the appointment directly in the hands of the Secretary of State. If the Secretary of Defense disagrees, the issue goes to the President. This gives the Secretary of Defense a veto power. He should have no more than this in my opinion.

In your scheme for Advisory Groups or Boards - is it advisable to emphasize the groups that are to make the most use of the intelligence? I know that this is your plan and I am probably wrong in feeling that the idea doesn't come through sharply enough. People collecting the intelligence and responsible for its processing are the key operating people in the various Departments, but the top advisors should in many cases be those who make use of the intelligence. Am I properly interpreting your objective here? Am I wrong in thinking that this could be more sharply clarified?

ASSIFIED



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